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Barry Cahill*

Ministerial Misfeasance: R. v. Morris
and a Unique Early Privacy Breach

According to Klein & Kratchanov (Government Information: The Right to Information
and Protection of Privacy in Canada, 2nd ed., 2009), "there is one reported case
of a successful private prosecution for violation of an access statute through the
unauthorized release of personal information. The matter arose under a former
Nova Scotia Act and resulted in a modest fine being imposed against a Minister
of the Crown who had disclosed information about the complainant." What follows
is a close, contextual study of a case unique in the short history of privacy law
in Canada, from the perspective of the thirty-year development of information
access and privacy law in Nova Scotia.

Selon Klein & Kratchanov (Government Information: The Right to Information
and Protection of Privacy in Canada, 29 6d., 2009), on ne relbve qu'un seul
cas o) une poursuite priv6e pour infraction aux lois sur I'acces a I'information
par la divulgation non autoris6e de renseignments personnels a 6t6 accueillie.
La poursuite a 6t6 intent6e sous le r6gime d'une ancienne loi de la Nouvelle-cosse, et un ministre de la Couronne qui avait divulgu6 des renseignements
sur le plaignant a 6t6 condamnd a payer une amende peu 6lev~e. Le texte qui
suit est une 6tude rigoureuse et contextuelle d'une affaire unique dans la courte
histoire du droit sur le respect de la vie privde au Canada, de la perspective
des developpements, au cours des trent derni~res ann~es, du droit sur I'acc~s 6
I'information et le respect de la vie priv~e en Nouvelle-Ecosse.

Barry Cahill, M.Litt. (Oxon.) is an independent scholar in Halifax. The author is grateful to
Brenda Thompson for her cooperation and invaluable assistance in the preparation of this article. He
also wishes to thank Heather Long and Diana Fancher for professional research assistance.
*
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It seems an Orwellian bizarrerie that a minister of the crown should
intentionally commit a privacy breach in order to counter media criticism
of his department.1 Yet in May 1987 Nova Scotia's Minister of Social
Services publicly disclosed sensitive personal information from the family
benefits application file of a client of his department who had written a
newspaper article denouncing Social Services and its minister. Today such
a disclosure would be, in the language of current law, "an unreasonable
invasion of a third party's personal privacy"2 and would necessarily
expose the minister to fine or imprisonment or both. Then, however, Nova
Scotians trying to obtain services from their government had a right to
privacy of personal information but no legally enforceable protection of
that right. The unfortunate individual whose privacy was breached was
a young single mother who responded by initiating a private prosecution
of the minister when the attorney general declined to act.3 The minister
was tried in Provincial Court for a summary conviction offence, found
guilty and fined $ 100.4 What follows is an analysis of R. v. Morris5 from
the perspective of the origin and development of information access and
privacy law in Nova Scotia.
According to the leading Canadian text in the field, R. v. Morris is the
"only reported case of a successful private prosecution for violation of an
access statute through the unauthorized release of personal information."6
Though not of high precedential value, the case made history and it
certainly made news. The access statute concerned was Canada's first 7

I. The Nova Scotia Government Privacy Policy, approved by Cabinet in 2008, defines "privacy
breach" as "Unauthorized collection, access, use, disclosure, storage or alteration of personal
information": Management Manual #300 Common Services, Chapter 4.11.
2.
Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, S.N.S. 1993, c. 5, s. 20(l).
3. At the time there was no independent crown prosecution service separate from the Department
of the Attorney General (since 1993 Department of Justice).
4.
Except where otherwise indicated, this article is based on news reports in Halifax's daily
newspapers, Chronicle-Herald,Daily News and Mail-Star, May 1987 through January 1988.
5. (1988), 85 N.S.R. (2nd) 200, 216 A.P.R. 200 (N.S. Prov. Ct.); see "Unreported Decisions,"
(1988) 15:2 Nova Scotia Law News at 18, s.v. Administrative Law.
6. C. McNairn & C. Woodbury, Government Information:Access and Privacy, §6.6 ("Civil and
Criminal Liability for the Improper Release of Information") (Toronto: Carswell, 1989-2010) at 35.
See also K. Klein & D. Kratchanov, Government Information: The Right to Information and Protection
of Privacy in Canada, 2d ed., (Toronto: Carswell, 2009) at 3-31.
7. Freedom of Information Act, S.N.S. 1977, c. 10 (R.S.N.S, 1989, c. 180). Enacted in May 1977,
An Act respectingaccess by the public to information on file with the Government came into force by
proclamation on I Nov. 1977. It remained unamended until its repeal thirteen years later. A second
FOIA (Bill No.40, 1981) died on the order paper when the provincial election was called. If enacted,
it would have made significant procedural changes to decision, review and appeal and would have
entrenched privacy protection as an intrinsic value in both preamble and purpose. It is unclear why
the bill was not reintroduced after the Buchanan government was handily re-elected in October 1981.
Nine more years were to elapse before FOIA was replaced.
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and the first of three such acts passed in Nova Scotia between 1977 and
1993.8 The four-point preamble to the Freedom of Information Act, 1977
(hereafter, FOIA) linked protecting the public from government secrecy
to the 1848 achievement of democratically accountable government.
According to FOIA, government was to operate "openly and by providing
to the people access to as much information in the hands of Government
as possible without impeding the operation of Government or disclosing
personal information pertaining to persons or matters other than the person
desiring the information."9
Despite offering privacy protection, FOlAwas in no sense a PrivacyAct.
The concept is implicit in "personal information," but the term "privacy"
itself is absent. If there was a focus, it was not on third-party privacy
protection but on persons' gaining access to personal information about
themselves.'" The very existence and presence of personal information,
however, necessitated a limitation on access to information. Persons whose
information was on file with government exercised "rights" respecting
it, while departments as personal information custodians incurred
corresponding "obligations."" The former included access and correction,
the latter privacy protection. The framers of FOIA could scarcely have
imagined that the operations of government would be impeded by privacy
protection, or, worse, advanced by privacy breaches. Such was the anomaly
of R. v. Morris, which Heather Mitchell, the Toronto lawyer who authored
the first Canadian text on access to information law, pronounced "a first in
Canadian j urisprudence."" Twenty years after, the case remains a one-off;
it made an example of a senior cabinet minister and, as such, has proved a
highly effective deterrent to ministerial irresponsibility.
Though FOIA entrenched a specific right of access to personal
information about the person making the request, otherwise departments
exercised wide discretion over access to information. The ruling principle
seemed to be not good .stewardship or public trusteeship but feudal
lordship. Government was obliged to disclose very little government
information, and departments as a rule disclosed no more than they had

8.
The others are the Freedom ofInformation Act, S.N.S. 1990, c. II and the Freedom ofInformation
and Protectionof Privacy Act, S.N.S. 1993, c. 5.
9.
FOIA, Preamble, paragraph 4.
10. Historically, government secrecy was so excessive and pervasive that persons had difficulty
gaining access to information about themselves even for purposes of correction or other legitimate
administrative uses. Access therefore had a double aspect: personal access to personal information and
public access to government information. In Morris we detect the tendency to conflate the two aspects
of access/disclosure.
11. FOIA ss. 6(1) and 6(2).
12. "Cabinet minister convicted, fined in privacy case" Toronto Star (16 January 1988).
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to or wanted to. Access to information was more narrowly construed
than privacy protection, which, though incidental to FOIA, was a basic
expectation of citizenship and civic life. Privacy protection was a factor
and function of personal information given effect as a necessary exemption
of personal information from disclosure. Since personal information was
a class of government information to which FOIA applied, there could
not be freedom of information without privacy protection. At a time when
privacy was taken as read and access to information the exception rather
than the rule, critics of FOIA were less concerned with privacy protection
than with government secrecy.'3 Secrecy, not privacy, was the bigger
challenge because invasions of privacy were unlikely to occur if nothing
other than what would now be regarded as routine or public-record was
disclosed. Nor was personal information by any means the only exception
to disclosure.
FOIA was ten years old when the notorious privacy breach occurred,
and though it had been judicially considered from time to time, it had never
been the subject of an adjudication. Just as it had not occurred to anyone
that government would unlawfully disclose personal information, nor did
anyone think that an access to information act could be used to protect the
right to privacy of personal information. The victim, Brenda Thompson,
afterwards wrote about her experience in the "brief autobiography"
appended to her 1992 master's thesis in sociology:
In less than a month after becoming involved with the group [Mothers
United For Metro Shelter - MUMS], I was embroiled in a legal battle
with the provincial Social Services Minister. In my capacity as welfare
mother activist, I had written an opinion piece for a local newspaper on
the regressive and sexist welfare policies which our Minister of Social
Services had implemented in his five years in office. His response to
my public criticism was to retaliate by revealing extremely personal
information from my welfare file to the news media. I demanded a public
apology. I hired a lawyer14 and laid charges against him with the help
of another single mothers group, Legal Action for Women on Welfare
(LAWW).
The ensuing battle received attention in the provincial legislature and

13. FOIA was not in good odour among informed critics, one of whom alleged that the Liberal
government of Premier Gerald Regan which introduced it had "acted less out of devotion to open
government than out of embarrassment at having been caught laundering a report on the environmental
impact of the Wreck Cove [Victoria County) hydroelectric project": Parker Barss Donham, "Freedom
law returns to the back burner" Globe and Mail (27 February 1982). The report referred to was
Environmental Assessment and Management Strategy: Wreck Cove Hyrdoelectric Project (1976).
14. Anne S. Derrick, now Her Honour Judge Derrick of the Provincial Court.
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in the local and national press. 5 The court case went on for several
months 6 with the outcome being in my favour. This drew a tremendous
amount of attention and debate on the issue of single motherhood in
Nova Scotia.' 7

The 21 May 1987 issue of Halifax's Daily News carried a lengthy oped by Thompson entitled, "Social Services a system of frustration." In
it she severely criticized both the Department of Social Services and its
minister, a post which Edmund Morris, the former MP and mayor of
Halifax, had held in the Progressive Conservative Government of Premier
John Buchanan since 1981. Six days after the article appeared Morris
reacted by disclosing sensitive personal information about its author in
the House of Assembly, where his remarks were protected by legislative
privilege. 8 Once outside the House, however, he pursued the same
line with reporters. A few weeks later, during an interview for CTV's
nationally telecast public affairs program, W5, Morris acknowledged and
defended the action he had taken and indicated he might do so again if
circumstances warranted.
Morris's action seemed a variation.on the theme of eminent domain,
if not droit de seigneur: the minister exercised sovereign personal control
over all information in his department, with the right of disclosure. 9 He
did not distinguish between "internal use only" and public disclosure as fair
use serving a legitimate operational purpose. It was one thing for Morris
to access Thompson's file in order to brief himself on the substance of her
allegations; quite another for him publicly to disclose personal information
about Thompson in order to abuse, discredit, embarrass, intimidate, punish
or silence her. By exercising her right of free speech Thompson found her
right to privacy sacrificed.20 Professor Wayne MacKay of Dalhousie Law
School was quick to observe that the minister's "pre-emptive strike on

15. The case was densely covered in both the Toronto Globe and Mail and Star after charges were
laid.
16. November 1987 through January 1988.
17. Brenda Juanita Thompson, Single Mother Activists on Welfare: An Examination of Social Roots
of CollectiveAction in Nova Scotia (M.A. thesis, Acadia University, 1992) at 107-8 [unpublished].
18. For obvious reasons they were not recorded in Assembly Debates.
19. Morris may have seen this disclosure of personal information as disclosure in the public
interest-though FOIA contained no such override. The Freedom of Information Act, 1990 provided
for limited and qualified public-interest disclosure of personal information; S.N.S., 1990, c. 11, s. 6.
20. On May 29" the Daily News published a sequel, "Welfare moms scorned for being poor," which,
according to the byline, had been "written before [Thompson] became the subject of debate at Province
House this week." See also "Brenda Thompson's story: Why does Mr. Morris infuriate her so much?"
Pandora(Halifax) (September-December 1987).
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free speech" was an "outrageous invasion of privacy" which appeared
clearly to violate FOIA. 2'
The interpretation section of FOIA defined personal information
as "information respecting a person's identity, residence, dependants,
marital status, employment, borrowing and repayment history, income,
assets and liabilities, creditworthiness, education, character, reputation,
health, physical or personal characteristics or mode of living" 22 - many
if not most of which would necessarily figure in any application under
the Family Benefits Act. 23 FOIA also provided that "a person in respect

of whom personal information is contained [maintained?] in a file by a
department may.. .request that the information contained in the file not be
used or made available for any purpose other than the purpose for which
it was provided without.. .consent. '24 Thompson, of course, had made no

such request, never anticipating that the personal information contained
in her family benefits application file would be used or disclosed for any
purpose other than the purpose for which it was provided, without her
consent.
By June 1987 Thompson was considering the possibility of taking
legal action against the Minister of Social Services. On 4 October the
W5 feature ("a single mother's battle over the release of confidential
information"), for which both Thompson and Morris were interviewed,
was broadcast. So unrepentant was the minister ("Morris offered a fiery
defence on the show")

25

that Thompson's lawyer began to explore and

explain the legal options available to her. On 31 October Thompson made
the decision to prosecute Morris. Two weeks later, Brenda Thompson
went before a justice of the peace to swear out an information charging
Edmund Morris under Section 4 of the Summary ProceedingsAct, offence
and penalty not being provided for in FOIA.26 The charge alleged that
by disclosing personal information about Thompson without her consent,
the minister had contravened subsection 6(2)(a) of FOIA: "A department
maintaining personal information files shall not make the personal
information contained therein available to another department or person

21. "Single mom outraged after her file released" Toronto Star (12 June 1987).
22. FOIA s. 2(g).
23. R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 158 (repealed 2000). It was enacted in 1977, the same year as FOIA.
24. FOIA ss.. 6(l)(b).
25. "Brenda's on TV" Daily News (5 October 1987). No transcript of the W5 feature exists.
26. "Every one who, without lawful excuse, contravenes an enactment by wilfully doing anything
that it forbids or by wilfully omitting to do anything that it requires to be done is, unless some penalty
or punishment is expressly provided by law, guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction
and liable to a fine of not more than five hundred dollars or to imprisonment for sixt months or to
both."
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for another purpose without the person's consent." Thompson, of course,
had not given her consent, nor had it been asked for, nor would it have
been given if it had been.
The same day the charge was laid, Thompson's lawyer wrote the attorney
general27 asking that an independent special prosecutor be appointed to act
for the crown, in order to preclude a looming conflict of interest: Morris's
son was a crown attorney in the Department of the Attorney General.
The attorney general replied that he would not agree, to counsel's request
unless Thompson stayed the private prosecution, thus allowing for a
police investigation to proceed and charges to be laid by the provincial
crown. Understandably Thompson's lawyer, faced with an imminent filing
deadline, declined to risk abandoning the private prosecution. Then, in a
surprise move, on the very eve of Morris's scheduled arraignment Premier
Buchanan shuffled his cabinet and reorganized the government. Morris
found himself demoted from Social Services but retained as a minister. His
former department was discreetly renamed "Community Services."
On 25 November Morris appeared before Judge William J.C. Atton
of the Provincial Court, which had jurisdiction over offences against
provincial statutes. Morris's lawyer 8 moved to have the information
quashed on two grounds, one procedural the other substantive: first,
that the information lacked sufficient particulars to show that an offence
existed or had been committed and secondly, that "a minister could not
commit an offence under the act. 2 9 As minister Morris was presumed
immune from prosecution; above a law which applied to his department
but not, a fortiori, to himself. In one sense, counsel's point was well-taken.
The minister had no express standing under FOIA except on appeal fromdecisions of the deputy minister. It was as if Morris could be minister
of social services without being accountable head of the department of
that name and assuming responsibility for its actions even when taken
personally by himself on its behalf and on his own authority as minister.
Despite being a convenient legal fiction, the argument was also reflected
in the information, which specified "Edmund Morris" not "minister of
social services." Had Morris not been minister, of course, he would not have
enjoyed the privilege of unfettered access to Thompson's family benefits
application file which enabled him to disclose personal information from
it. Minister and department were integrated and inseparable. Though FOIA
27. Correspondence with the late Terence R.B. Donahoe Q.C. is in the solicitor's file; courtesy
Brenda Thompson.
28. A. Lloyd Caldwell Q.C. The late Mr. Caldwell was a Conservative senior lawyer in private
practice.
29. "Morris to stand trial" Chronicle-Herald(23 December 1987).
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did not define the term "department" as including the minister thereof, it
equated Department with "Government," in other words Cabinet ministers
collectively or individually. Morris was ex officio head of the department
maintaining the personal information which was disclosed regardless
of the only condition, other than consent, which authorized disclosure:
"Every person shall be permitted access to information respecting...
personal information contained in files pertaining to the person making
the request. '3° Moreover, as minister of social services Morris was the
designated minister responsible not only for specific legislation like the
Family Benefits Act, but also for the operation within his own department
of legislation of general applicability like FOIA. The Family Benefits Act
did not make any provision for securing the privacy protection of client
case files because it did not need to. FOIA applied to all information "on
file with the government" unless another enactment took precedence.
There was no question that the privacy of personal information contained
in family benefits application case files was fully protected. Ironically,
FOIA seemed to offer more in the way of protection of privacy than it did
freedom of information.
That personal information was mandatorily exempt from disclosure
unless the requester was the subject of it, or had given consent, did not mean
that a minister was powerless to disclose it. On the contrary, ministerial
privilege was interpreted to mean that disclosure could be presumed
authorized if the minister did the disclosing. Due process could safely
be disregarded because the minister was somehow outside and beyond
the reach of statute law governing his own department. Yet a minister
with departmental responsibilities could scarcely waive his department's
obligations respecting personal information. The minister's responsibility
for ensuring that the department complied with its obligations was
increased, not reduced by his standing at arm's length from first-instance
decision-making on FOIA requests. Morris's action amounted to trespass
against his prescribed role as reviewer of decisions made under the act.
Morris, for his part, seems to have taken the view that ministerial
powers in relation to FOIA were residual and supererogatory. Not only
could he hear appeals from decisions of the deputy minister; he could
also treat, handle and dispose of information in any manner he saw fit including arbitrary, ex parte, public disclosure of personal information. On
the face of it, since FOIA conferred on the minister a power of independent
review, he could not, for the purposes of FOIA, be a member or agent of
the department. By the same token, however, the minister would have been
30.

FOIA s. 3(g).
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precluded from taking any action whatsoever beyond reviewing decisions
on access requests, and then only at the request of the applicant. FOIA did
not contemplate disclosure decisions without access requests, much less
unilateral external disclosure for a non-administrative purpose. There was
no ministerial override.
Judge Atton reserved decision on the defence motion. Each counsel
having submitted memoranda of law to supplement oral argument Thompson's lawyer's ran to nine densely-written pages3' - on 4 December
Judge Atton dismissed the motion to quash and ordered Morris arraigned.
He also recused himself, citing conflict of interest. The matter of a trial
judge had been referred to Harry How, Chief Judge of the Provincial
Court, who decided that a judge of the Provincial Court should not preside
lest the independence of the judiciary be seen to be compromised. Judge
Atton's highly unusual recusal was due to the accused's being a member of
.the Cabinet, which appointed Provincial Court judges. Worse still, Judge
Atton was chair and Morris a member of the tribunal which determined
the salaries and benefits for judges of the Provincial Court. The case
was thereupon adjourned until 18 December for arraignment and plea.
A federally-appointed judge to preside was found. Mr Justice K. Peter
Richard of the Supreme Court, Trial Division, accepted the invitation to
sit as a judge extraordinary of the Provincial Court, which the Judicature
Act permitted him to do. It is unclear why none of the three judges of the
County Court for District Number One (Halifax County) was called upon
to preside.
Morris was arraigned a week before Christmas and pleaded not guilty.
Defence counsel announced that he would be making pre-trial the same
motion to quash the information as had already been argued and dismissed
pre-arraignment. The rehearing and prosecution objections thereto were
set down for 22 December. In the event, Justice Richard declined to rehear
the application, sustaining the prosecution objection that the motion to
quash had already been considered and disposed of by the court. He also
remarked by way of obiter dictum that he would probably have made the

31. Of Derrick's 53 points, the 3 7 1hwas the most telling: "If Mr. Morris as an individual is not
within the meaning of department in Section 6(2)(a) [of FOIA], then one result of this would be that
no individual could be brought within this definition and the section would be rendered meaningless.
Another possible result would be that a department would be prohibited from releasing personal
information but a Minister would be able to do so with impunity. It was surely not the legislative
intent to exclude a Minister from the prohibition against release of information, The former result is
patently absurd and the latter would place the Minister above the law": Derrick to Atton, 2 December
1987; supra note 27.
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same ruling as Judge Atton had he been required to consider the original
question on its merits.32
The case came to trial on 15 January 1988. A packed courtroom
and full day's hearing of evidence featured a parade of witnesses,
among them the complainant, who was cross-examined at length by
counsel for the accused.33 Morris did not testify in his own defence, thus
avoiding what would surely have been a rigorous cross-examination by
counsel for the prosecution. Three reporters testified that the minister
had disclosed Thompson's personal information to them in interviews.
Two audiovideotapes made 27 and 28 May 1987 by reporters who had
interviewed Morris outside the legislature were replayed, as was the W5
segment. The defence went so far as to contend not only that the identity
of the putative father of Thompson's child was not personal information
as defined in FOIA, but also that the ad hominem character of Thompson's
op-ed in the Daily News amounted to implied consent to the release of
personal information about her; that she had in effect waived her right
to privacy by volunteering personal information about herself in a public
forum.
On request of counsel, Justice Richard allowed Morris to move
from prisoner's bench to counsel table, as if to suggest he were the
defendant in a civil suit rather than the accused in a prosecution. Counsel
also made two further unsuccessful efforts to have the case dismissed.
The court found Morris guilty as charged, the judge making clear in his
decision that the minister was an agent of the department more so than
any employee. Defence moved for an absolute discharge, but the motion
was successfully opposed on the grounds of case law. Another substantive
legal point addressed was whether Thompson's opinion piece constituted
provocation amounting to "lawful excuse," which would have vacated the
charge. Thompson, who was prepared to carry the case to a higher court if
the accused were acquitted, did not appeal the nominal fine of $100, 34 nor
did Morris his conviction.3 Bruce MacKinnon's cartoon in the Herald of
19 January 1988 ("Item: Morris Found Guilty Of Exposing Confidential
Information") depicted Thompson as a smiling Salome bearing away on a
platter the severed head of Morris's decapitated John the Baptist.

32. Derrick to Thompson, 23 December 1987; supra note 27.
33. The trial transcript has not survived.
34. Counsel for accused proposed $300 while counsel for informant sought four times the maximum
then allowable under the act: $2000.
35. The Canadian Press reported that an appeal on Morris's behalf was under consideration;
"Buchanan backs convicted minister" Globe and Mail (20 January 1988).
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Even before it became clear that the trial would proceed, Government
had announced its decision to pay Morris's legal expenses.3 6 Once the
accused was convicted, government had little choice but to agree to the
request to pay Thompson's as well.37 Morris retained his seat in Cabinet,
despite Opposition calls for his sacking. Premier Buchanan predicted that
Morris's conviction would result in a review of FOIA, lest the act have
a chilling effect on ministers doing their jobs by speaking their minds.
Morris resigned from Cabinet in July 1988 and from the Legislature
in September; the case had put a shabby end to his long and otherwise
distinguished political career. Thompson, for her part, repaid the staunch
support she had received both inside and outside the Legislature from
Alexa McDonough (party leader) and Robert Levy (MLA, Kings South)
by standing for the New Democratic Party in the 1988 provincial election.
Though unsuccessful, her candidacy and vigorous campaign helped
ensure the defeat of the Conservative incumbent in Dartmouth North,
the Reverend Laird Stirling, Morris's predecessor as Minister of Social
Services, who was the only Cabinet minister defeated in the Buchanan
government's return to power. R. v. Morris also helped launch a Halifax
journalistic institution. The first issue of Frank, a biweekly satirical
magazine, appeared between charge and arraignment and featured on its
cover Edmund Morris descending the main staircase at Province House.
FOIA was neither reviewed, nor revised and amended in response to
the Morris decision. In June 1990, however, near the end of the Buchanan
premiership, it was repealed and replaced. The new Freedom ofinformation
Act was in part reactive but also a constructive response to Morris. It
substantially redefined "personal information," enlarging its scope to
include the very sort of information which had been unlawfully disclosed.38
For greater certainty, it spelled out- that "A department and the minister
thereof shall not disclose information that is personal information,"3 9
and it defined "minister" as a member of the cabinet. 40 Significantly, it
also introduced a privative clause barring the prosecution of anyone

36. "Province will pay for Morris's lawyer -premier" Chronicle-Herald(24 November 1987).
However, the Cabinet stopped short of appointing a government lawyer to defend Morris, which would
have put paid to the argument that he was being prosecuted in his private rather than his ministerial
capacity.
37. They amounted to some $14,000.
38. S.N.S. 1990, c.11,
s.3(e)(v): "correspondence sent to a department by the person that is implicitly
or explicitly of a private or confidential nature, and replies to that correspondence that would reveal the
contents of the original correspondence."
39. Emphasis added.
40. The Executive Council Act identifies ministers by their departmental responsibility.

378

The Dalhousie Law Journal

who in good faith disclosed information subject to the act.4' Finally, it
made abundantly clear, as its predecessor had not, that the act imposed
obligations on ministers of the crown ("Act binds Her Majesty").
To paraphrase the long title of FOIA, an act respecting access by the
public to information on file with government did not authorize ministers
publicly to disclose personal information on file with government. If
citizens had the right to information access, then they also had the right to
information privacy - and government the corresponding duty to protect
the privacy of citizens. Under FOIA a cabinet minister was successfully
prosecuted for failing to comply with his department's obligations
respecting personal information. Under Nova Scotia's second Freedom
of InformationAct, the minister probably could not have been prosecuted
at all. The third and current Freedom of Information and Protection of
Privacy Act, which came into force on Canada Day 1994, created the
summary offence of maliciously disclosing personal information.42 It also
makes clear that disclosure of personal information is "presumed to be an
unreasonable invasion of a third party's personal privacy if the personal
information relates to eligibility for income assistance or social-service
benefits or to the determination of benefit levels. '43 Both provisions were
a resonant reminder of the 1987 breach of Brenda Thompson's privacy."
Twenty years ago, the people of Nova Scotia needed protecting from
an abuse of state power quite different from denying access to government
information. However incompatible government secrecy may be with
democratic accountability, government negligence in the matter of privacy
protection is no less incompatible with fundamental rights. The more
absolute the privilege of administrative access to personal information,
the heavier the burden of responsibility on public servants to protect it
from disclosure. An unlawful disclosure of personal information could not
be presumed authorized on any grounds, nor did ministerial fiat amount
to authorization. As minister, Morris was uniquely positioned to exercise
force majeure and did not hesitate to do so. That the deed was intentionally
done by him, rather than accidentally by an ordinary employee of the
department, only aggravated the assault on privacy. Deliberate unlawful

-41. S.N.S. 1990, c. 11,s. 14 ("No prosecution lies").
42. Freedom of Information and Protectionof Privacy Act, S.N.S. 1993, c. 5, s. 47(1).
43. Ibid., s. 20(3)(c).
44. The PrivacyReview Officer Act (S.N.S. 2008, c. 42), as recently proclaimed, enables the Review
Officer under the Freedom of Information andProtectionof PrivacyAct to "initiate an investigation of
privacy compliance if there are reasonable grounds to believe that a person has contravened or is about
to contravene the privacy provisions and the subject-matter of the review relates to the contravention"
[s. 5(l)(b)]; this refers to a privacy breach.
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disclosure of personal information was not a ministerial perquisite. The
king can do some wrong.

